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ABSTRACT: The paper argues that argument and argumentation deserve philosophical attention but do not
receive it, and proposes some explanations. It then asks whether there is a field of philosophy, “philosophy
of argument,” that might attract philosophers’ attention. A case is made that such a field exists. However,
challenges to that case seriously undermine it. Thus those who want philosophers to pay more attention to
argument must find other ways to make their case.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Arguments are ubiquitous, and the activities of making extended arguments and of
trading arguments (i.e., argumentation) are ubiquitous. Moreover, the practice of making
and trading arguments is important. For one thing, arguments and argumentation seem in
several ways essential to democracy. By using them to try to win popular support
politicians and political parties seek power based on the consent of the people—one leg
upon which democracy rests. Second, by figuring centrally in legal proceedings they are
essential to the rule of law, which is another leg on which democracy rests. Third, since
in democratic legislatures proposed laws are debated and expected to be based on
evidence and good reasons, that is, arguments, they underpin democracy in yet another
way. Arguments are also essential to science, since scientific theories are expected to be
supported by arguments for their truth, consisting in part of the empirical evidence that
backs them up. Arguments in fact figure similarly in every discipline of knowledge or
enquiry. The claims made in all of the social sciences and humanities are expected to be
supported by arguments, and the critical assessment of theories and the arguments offered
in support of them are in turn expected to be backed by arguments. Arguments certainly
figure prominently in philosophy, and if not every single philosopher proceeds by
bringing forward arguments for his or her philosophical position, the exceptions (e.g.,
Nietzsche) prove the rule (e.g., Aristotle, Aquinas, Anscombe). Philosophical
investigations typically proceed by examining the arguments for and against various
alternative positions, and doing so by means of argued challenges or questions. Also, in
their private lives people are routinely expected by their families and friends and
Blair, J. A. (2009). Philosophy of Argument. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings
of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-13), Windsor, ON: OSSA.
Copyright © 2009, the author.

ANTHONY J. BLAIR
acquaintances to produce arguments to support their preferences, their choices or their
beliefs. Arguments are everywhere and they matter.
Philosophy is, among other things, the activity of inquiring critically into the basic
assumptions of human thought and understanding. Since argument is so crucial to human
thought, inquiring critically into the assumptions about its nature and operations seems an
obvious candidate for philosophical attention. It is, therefore, initially puzzling why (at
least Anglophone, predominantly analytic) philosophers devote so little attention to
arguments and argumentation.
Apart from the work on argument in recent decades by the small group of
philosophers identified with what is called “informal logic,” the number of works by
Anglophone philosophers on argument and argumentation is small. One thinks of
Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument (1958), now 50 years old and after being subject to
negative reviews largely ignored in the general philosophical community, or of
Johnstone, Jr.’s Philosophy and Argument (1959), also 50 years old and little studied.
Hamblin’s Fallacies (1970), Wellman’s Challenge and Response (1971) and Rescher’s
Dialectics (1977), each about different aspects of arguments and argumentations, were
not influential in philosophical circles except among the informal logicians. Goldman’s
devotion of an entire chapter to argumentation in Knowledge in a Social World (1999) is
a rarity in the work of prominent Anglophone analytic philosophers. Others may add a
few works to this list, but in the end, relative to the whole body of philosophical research
in the past half century, it will be very short.
A possible clue to one explanation lies in Harman’s treatment of argument in
Change of View (1986). Harman’s focus is reasoning, not argument, and he is at pains to
distinguish reasoning from argument. His conception of argument is revealed in the title
he gives to the section in question, “Reasoning Distinguished from Argument or Proof”
(ibid., p. 3), in which he equates argument with proof:
[…] reasoning in this [his favored] sense may often be conflated with reasoning in another sense,
namely argument for, or proof of, a conclusion from premises via a series of intermediate steps
(ibid.).

He goes on:
Rules of argument are principles of implication, saying that propositions (or statements) of such
and such a sort imply propositions (or statements) of such and such a such other sort” (ibid.).

Harman regards such rules as the “logic” of proofs or arguments: “rules of deduction are
rules of deductive argument” (ibid., p. 5) and in the absence of a logic there can be no
argument:
Rules of inductive argument would be rules of ‘inductive logic’ […] however, […] there is no well
developed enterprise of inductive logic in the way that there is for deductive logic […] (ibid.);

and, although he does not do so explicitly, Harman seems to infer from the lack of a well
developed inductive logic that “it is not clear there is such a thing as inductive argument”
(ibid., p. 6). If Harman is representative of analytic philosophy in this respect, an
argument is regarded as a proof or justification, and there can be proofs only when there
are well-developed principles of implication worked out of the kind that are worked out
2
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for deductive logic. Even where the working out of such principles of implication is the
objective of an ongoing task, as Harman hints might be the case with inductive logic
(although it hasn’t happened yet), such a task belongs to logic. Thus the idea of the study
of arguments or argumentation being independent of the study of logic is foreign one to
this way of thinking about them both. Since logic is a well-established branch of
philosophy, and since there is plenty of activity occurring in attempting to establish all
kinds of logics, there is no point to an independent study of argument or of
argumentation, and in fact, from the perspective described here, it would make no sense
at all to do so.
The sense of ‘argument’ of the kind of argument Harman was keen to distinguish
from the reasoning of the kind he was focusing on in Change of View is—as he might
agree—quite specialized. The arguments used in the practice of law are not proofs; nor
are the arguments exchanged in political campaigns or on the floors of legislatures, or the
arguments used in support of applications for jobs, or the arguments used in book or film
or concert or any other kind of performance reviews, or the arguments offered in support
of predictions of any kind (be they about the weather, product safety, the performance of
the stock market, or whatever), or the arguments in support of choices or decisions about
courses of action or about policies. These are just a few of the sorts of arguments that are
not proofs; the list is very long indeed. It is not that these are failed proofs, or pseudoproofs or quasi-proofs. They are not supposed to be or expected to be proofs and their
exemplary instances are not proofs. What are the salient characteristics of these types of
arguments? Are they all of a kind or do they belong in different categories? What norms
ought to govern these arguments? What is their “logic” or what are their “logics”? One
might have thought that philosophers would be interested in trying to answer these and
related questions.
Possibly, the arguments that are expected to be used in the practice of philosophy
are arguments that are proofs. Whether philosophers as a rule do use arguments that are
proofs, proof might be the ideal to which philosophers hold themselves. Such an
assumption would help to explain why philosophers, in reflecting on their own methods,
do not pay attention to arguments that are not, and are not intended to be, proofs. It does
not explain, however, why philosophers (with the exceptions noted) have not paid
attention to those other kinds of arguments when not focused on their own methods.
Another possible explanation, consistent with the last one, is that philosophers
have equated reasoning and argument, which seems to have been the worry that Harman
was keen to guard against in the passage discussed above. If reasoning is identified with
inferring, or at least if one kind of reasoning is inferring, then a passage from Copi’s
classic, Introduction to Logic, is pertinent:
The process of inference is not of primary interest to logicians. But corresponding to every
possible inference is an argument, and it is with these arguments that logic is chiefly concerned
(Copi 1982, p. 6).

In this connection it is noteworthy that Scriven’s 1976 textbook is titled Reasoning, but
when the four “aims of the book” are listed on its first page of text—the first two of
which are

3

ANTHONY J. BLAIR
1. To improve your skill in analyzing and evaluating arguments and presentations […] 2. To improve
your skill in presenting arguments, reports and instructions clearly and persuasively” (p. ix, italics
added)

—there is no mention of reasoning. If reasoning and argument are interchangeable, then
everything philosophers have written about reasoning, a topic to which a great deal of
philosophical attention has been devoted, can be applied to argument. In that case, there
is no need for separate attention to be paid to argument.
However, just as it is a mistake to assimilate all arguments to proofs, so it is a
mistake to identify reasoning and argument, whatever their connection. It (typically)
takes reasoning to solve a Sudoku puzzle, but in doing so one is not seeking to persuade
or convince anyone or to justify any proposition, and there is no difference of opinion to
resolve, so reasoning is possible without argument. As Harman notes, just as Strawson
(1952, p. 12) did before him, one can reason that one proposition implies another, so that
if the first is true, then so is the second, but that reasoning does not commit one to an
argument in support of the second, for one could equally reason, and argue, that on that
basis one should reject the first, or reject the implication. Also, one can (cynically) use
arguments whose premises and support relation one does not accept to try to persuade
someone to do or believe something, and in that case although one has argued, the
argument does not express one’s reasoning, so argument is possible without reasoning
corresponding to it. (To be sure, the cynical arguer reasons that the dupe will buy the
argument, though he doesn’t present that reasoning as an argument to the dupe.)
Since far from all arguments are proofs, and since what’s said of reasoning cannot
straightforwardly apply to argument, arguments represent a topic that has not been
addressed by the philosophical attention that has been devoted to proofs and to reasoning.
Yet it seems that philosophers ought to pay attention to argument, if only because
in almost every philosophy department or program in Canada and the United States (if
not elsewhere) there is a course offered in which undergraduates are taught to recognize,
analyze and evaluate arguments, and often also to construct and express them.
Philosophers thus have an obligation not to mis-educate their students about arguments,
and hence to be sure that what they are teaching is the state of the art. It is also possible
that moral or legal or aesthetic or practical arguments are different from the proofs
required in epistemology or metaphysics or logic, and in that case it is philosophically
important in the fields of philosophical ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of law or any branch
of practical (action-oriented) philosophy to discern the nature and norms of such
arguments.
Given that philosophers have overlooked argument as a topic of philosophical
attention, how might their attention to it be piqued? One possibility is to persuade them
that argument is actually an overlooked topic of philosophy—that there exists a
philosophical subject matter that qualifies for the label “philosophy of argument.” The
situation might be thought analogous to the case that was made in the recent past that
feminist philosophy is a topic of philosophy, as is the philosophy of feminism. Perhaps
the philosophy of argument should be held out as a new field of philosophy and a
campaign for its installation begun.
But is there such a thing as the philosophy of argument (even if it isn’t
recognized)? Let us examine a possible case for the proposition that there is.
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2. A CASE FOR “THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT”
For the purpose of this paper, I take philosophy to consist of (a) the elucidation, and (b)
the critical assessment, of the basic assumptions of the human understanding of the
animate and inanimate world, and ways of acting in it, and of proposed revisions of such
assumptions. As such it is concerned with the elucidation and critical assessment of the
basic assumptions of, among other things, significant human practices. “Fields” of
philosophy will thus include the philosophical study of significant human practices. That
may be the reason that there are such recognized and active fields of philosophy as the
philosophy of art, of economics, of education, of history, of language, of law, of
literature, of logic, of mathematics, of music, of politics, of religion, of science, of the
social sciences, and of sport.
(By the way, philosophy so understood is not the exclusive prerogative of
professional philosophers, and plenty of argumentation theorists who are not philosophers
by profession quite properly engage in philosophical discussions about argument and
develop philosophical positions on the salient related questions. The concern of this paper
is that professional philosophers seem on the whole to disregard argument as a topic
worthy of philosophical attention.)
As I have pointed out already, there can be no doubt that arguing is a significant
activity, but what seems to makes something worthy of there being a “philosophy of …”
connected with it depends, beyond its importance, on whether it raises philosophical
questions. Thus it has to raise a question related to basic assumptions about how we
understand and act in the world. Does argument meet this test?
Some fields of philosophy, such as the philosophy of religion and the philosophy
of science, are dominantly related to particular kinds of belief. Others, such as the
philosophy of education or of law, are more related to particular kinds of social practice.
The philosophy of argument, were it to qualify as an area of philosophy, would be like
the latter rather than the former. There are religious and scientific beliefs, but there are
not argumentative beliefs, whereas there are argumentation practices. So what kinds of
philosophical questions get raised when a practice is the subject of philosophical inquiry?
In what follows, I list five indicators that seem to mark the philosophical
significance of practices that are presently acknowledge as fields or areas of philosophy,
and consider whether argument would satisfy these criteria.
(1) The nature/definition of the practice is problematic in ways that raise philosophical
questions.
One feature of areas to which explicit philosophical attention has been devoted is that the
very nature of the practice is problematic, and any characterization of it must contain
contentious philosophical assumptions. Thus any view about very nature of art, or
education, or law, or sport is controversial (subject to dispute), given that different views
rely on incompatible philosophical assumptions (about beauty, about social ideals, about
the nature of political obligation, or about work, leisure and play). In asking, for instance,
what counts as an instance or episode of the practice, and how it is to be distinguished
from similar or related activities that are distinct from it, such further questions emerge.
Asking, “What is sport?” for example raises the question how sport is related to play, or
5
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exercise, or commerce, or games, and thus leads to questions about what should be
considered its defining norms. “What is education?” raises questions about how it is
related to instruction, training, socialization or indoctrination, hence to questions about
what its defining objectives should be, and thus to questions about the good for human
beings. In short, questions about the nature of such activities are normative; while often
framed as requesting a description—“What is X?”—the attempt to answer them reveals
that answering them actually requires a prescription—“The best way(s) to conceive of X
is … ”
Similar questions apply to argument and argumentation. Does the concept of
argument entail that or persuasion (or attempted persuasion)? Does it entail that of
justification (or attempted justification)? Is argument essentially rational, and if so, of
what does the pertinent sort of rationality consist? What kind of entity is an argument?
Are there arguments independent of arguers—those who conceive them or create them or
recognize them—or are they always and only constructs of those who use them. Is the
practice of argumentation—that is, the exchange and argued critique of arguments for
some purpose—basic to the conception of an argument, so that we should understand any
argument as always and only the product of an episode of that practice? Is argumentation
essentially a speech event, or, more generally, essentially a kind of communication? Is
the objective of argumentation the resolution of disagreements, or the justification of
beliefs, or something else? Answers to all of these questions have been proposed and
argued for in the literature of the argumentation community over the past thirty years, and
elaborate theories have been generated to incorporate those answers. As with the
philosophical questions in other fields just mentioned, these ones can be recast as seeking
normative rather descriptive answers. And the answers will presuppose philosophical
positions. For example, if argumentation is (best conceived as) essentially rhetorical,
then the argumentation of philosophers and philosophy is (best conceived as) essentially
rhetorical.
(2) The norms applicable to the practice are in dispute and raise philosophical questions.
A second feature of practices to which explicit philosophical attention has been devoted
is that the norms governing or applicable to the practice are matters of contention, and the
debates about which norms are correct raise philosophical questions. If “What is art” is
controversial, “What is good art?” is controversial in spades. Is beauty a norm that should
apply to art? If so, what is to count as beauty? Should laws be assessed in terms of
whether they are just or how just they are? If so, what conception of justice should apply?
Is extreme fighting a bad sport? Should athletes be permitted to use performanceenhancing drugs? On what grounds are such judgments to be made? These practices
matter to us, and as a result, the norms they may be expected to exhibit, or strive for,
matter as well. And it is a topic of philosophical consideration what these norms ought to
be.
There are normative issues about the assessment of arguments, and they are
unresolved. Should deductive validity with true premises—“soundness”—be the criterion
of a good argument? If so, is it a necessary, or even a sufficient criterion? Are the only
good arguments sound ones? (If so, what is to be said of arguments of the form “p
therefore p” where p represents a true proposition? It is a sound argument, yet appears to
6
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beg the question.) Should inductive strength (equally) be a criterion? And what of
defeasible arguments, such as the presumptive arguments of morality or of law that are
not inductive in any sense in which that term is applied to arguments used in science?
Can they, or the best of them, count as good arguments? If so, on what basis? What
makes for a good presumptive argument? All of these are norms that are appealed to as in
some sense either logical or epistemological—although which of the two they are is a
matter of dispute. However, various rhetorical and dialectical theories also claim norms
that apply to arguments and argumentation. Some rhetoricians contend that arguments
should “fit” or be appropriate to the circumstances, and by that they do not mean simply
that arguments should be effective in the circumstances. 1 Some dialectical theorists
contend that argumentation should satisfy norms of a reasonable discussion, one likely to
result in a reasonable resolution of the disagreement that occasioned it (e.g., van
Eeemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Are these rhetorical and dialectical norms legitimate?
Are they consistent with each other and with logical or epistemological norms? The
answers to these questions belong to controversies that are far from being settled.
(3) The concepts needed for analysis and in evaluation are knotty and raise philosophical
questions.
A third feature of areas of practice that have attracted sufficient philosophical attention to
make them recognized sub-fields of the discipline is that the concepts employed in the
analysis and evaluation of these activities are vexing; they resist clear and uncontroversial
analysis. For example, in political philosophy, terms such as nation, state, sovereignty,
obligation, rights, liberty, freedom, autonomy, democracy, fascism and totalitarianism (to
list just a few) are so difficult to analyse in unproblematic ways that each has been the
topic of shelves of books, untold numbers of doctoral dissertations, and separate courses
of instruction.
The same conceptual or terminological problematicity holds true of the practice of
argument. As noted above, the understanding of the very concepts of argument and of
argumentation is itself in dispute. As well, logic, dialectic and rhetoric, as they relate to
argument and argumentation, are subject to a variety of incompatible interpretations, as is
the nature of their relationship one to another. In the fine-grained details of analysis, the
concepts of argument structure, form, format, and scheme are unsettled—that is, they are
given different interpretations by different theorists or theories. Premise, ground, data,
evidence, rule of inference, warrant are given differing interpretations. Varying concepts
of audience are at issue. The concepts of burden of proof and dialectical obligation are
analyzed variously. And so on.
(4) The relation of the practice to neighbouring practices is problematic and raises
philosophical questions.
Related to the feature that the nature of the practice is controversial is the feature that its
relation to neighbouring practices is unclear. In philosophy of art, how is art related to
1

For instance, the rhetorical theorist Michael Leff, in a lecture at the University of Windsor, 26 February
2009.
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decoration or design? If photography can be art, what is the difference between
photographic art and photo-journalism, which presumably isn’t art? In philosophy of
sport, how is sport related to play, to pastime, to work, to leisure activities? In philosophy
of education, how is education related to instruction, to teaching, to learning, to “selfimprovement,” as well as to indoctrination and to training? Such questions about topical
borders and overlap are common.
Analogous questions arise with respect to the practice of argument. How is it
related to the practice of rhetoric, to persuasion, to reasoning, to logic, to negotiation, to
quarrelling, or to decision-making? Argumentation theorists have taken positions on most
of these questions, but not all their views are compatible with one another.
(5) There is a need for a philosophical foundation for the practice.
So far I have been listing features that qualify a practice for treatment as an area of
philosophical study—features that also qualify argument and argumentation for treatment
as the philosophy of argument. Arguably, a necessary condition of such a field is that it is
a viable candidate for its own systematic philosophical treatment. That is, if the
philosophy of argument is to be a legitimate field of philosophy, then there must be
theoretical space for a philosophy of argument, and so for contending philosophies of
argument, 2 just as there is theoretical space for contending philosophies of art, of
education, or of law.
What does “a” philosophy of something, and of a practice in particular, consist
of? Consider philosophies of education. Any philosophy of education will address the
terminological or conceptual questions related to education, including what counts as
education and how education is related to different but related practices such as training.
A philosophy of education will contain a thesis about the (ideal) purpose(s) of education,
and will include the elucidation and defence of norms of education, so that education
proper can be distinguished from mis-education or propaganda. It will contain an account
of the role of education in society and of its value to society. Such a philosophy will
ultimately arise from philosophical positions on the nature of knowledge and of the good
for humans, individually and socially. A similar story will be told about philosophies of
law. Prescriptive analyses of the concepts of law, sovereignty, legal obligation and the
relations of law to morality and prudence, among much else will be part of any
philosophy of law. The (ideal) purpose of law in relation to human individual and social
good will be proposed. A typology of kinds of law will be included. All will arise from
theses about human individual and social nature.
A philosophy of argument will have analogous features. It will contain
prescriptive analyses of argument and argumentation, typologies where appropriate, and
accounts of logic, rhetoric and dialectic and how they (should be understood to) related to
argument and argumentation. The role(s) or function(s) of argument and argumentation
will be proposed, related to a conception of its purpose(s) in human society. It seems
likely that such a philosophy will include a position on the nature of rationality, since
argument on any account is purported to be a rational practice—an exercise of reason.
2

I owe this point and the thrust of the following analysis to Henrique Jales Ribiero, in correspondence. He
might well disagree with my handling of it.
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Since argument is also a practice—a kind of social practice, one that is learned and that
varies from society to society and within societies—a philosophy of argument must make
assumptions about the nature and possibilities for social interaction. A philosophy of
argument will take a position on what kind of entity an argument is (Is it a collection of
speech events? Is it a mental construct? Do arguments exist to be discovered, or are they
only creations of human minds?); in other words, it will include an ontology of argument.
And can arguments establish truths or reasonable beliefs, or only agreements or mutual
commitments? A philosophy of argument will have to take a stand on such questions, and
thus will include epistemological assumptions.
Like other fields of philosophy, a philosophy of argument will import applications
from other areas of philosophy. For instance, it is possible to conceive of argument as
playing a role in the construction and maintenance of certain kinds of societies, as some
theorists of democracy contend that it does. A philosophy of argument will have to take a
stand on this question, and thus will involve elements of a political philosophy.
Philosophy of language offers tools such as speech act theory for the interpretation of
arguments. At the same time, philosophy of argument should have implications for other
areas of philosophy. For instance, if it is shown that there can be cogent arguments that
are neither deductively valid nor inductively strong, then may be room for the argued
justification of normative assertions, whether prescriptions or commendations, without
being guilty of a naturalistic fallacy.
In sum, there does seem to be room for the generation of particular philosophies
of argument, differing on the basis of variations in their assumptions about metaphysics,
epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and perhaps even aesthetics. Conversely,
one might argue that any particular theory of argument will carry with it the assumptions
of an underlying philosophy of argument, whether or not these are made explicit.
The above considerations seem to lend support to the position that the philosophy
of argument is a legitimate distinct special area or field of philosophy.
3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
How might the critic respond to this case that the philosophy of argument is a legitimate
field of philosophy? I will consider three lines of criticism. The first two take the position
that the philosophy of argument is in some sense already recognized, but in a different
guise; the third takes the position that the case just made rests on a misconception of
argument and argumentation and implies that the idea of a philosophy of argument is a
mistake.
(a) The first line of criticism is based on the claim that the philosophy of logic is
the philosophy of argument and the philosophy of logic already exists. This point has
considerable truth to it, but it needs to be qualified. On the one hand, some of the
contentions made by some of the informal logicians against the standard conception of
logic belong to the philosophy of logic. For certainly one topic for the philosophy of logic
is the nature of logic, or how logic ought to be conceived. Some have held that logic is by
definition formal, and the push against that contention by informal logicians, with
argument in mind, constitutes a position within the philosophy of logic. Or, to take
another example, the contention of some informal logicians that arguments can embody
or exhibit legitimate principles of implication—as Harman put it, “saying that
9
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propositions (or statements) of such and such a sort imply propositions (or statements) of
such and such a such other sort,” in perfectly legitimate senses of ‘implication’ and
‘imply,’ which are not deductively valid, is to make a claim belonging to the philosophy
of logic. So the philosophy of logic does take up some of the issues related to argument,
and a separate branch of philosophy dubbed “philosophy of argument” to take up such
questions would be redundant.
On the other hand, there are philosophical questions about arguments that are not
about their logic. For instance, are the only legitimate criteria for assessing arguments
dialectical ones, as the Pragma-Dialectical theory seems to assert (van Eemeren &
Grootendorst 2004)? If rhetorical criteria conflict with dialectical criteria, does
reasonableness require the dialectical criteria to prevail? And in the face of dialectical and
rhetorical criteria, what is the role of logical criteria? And what is the precise nature of
the rhetorical character of arguments? Or, are some arguments rhetorical and others not?
And how is the dialectical nature of arguments and argumentation properly to be
understood. Is the dialogue model the correct model for interpreting arguments? Does the
Critical Discussion model of the Pragma-Dialectical theory adequate? These and many
other questions about arguments and argumentation do not, for the most part, engage
issues belonging to the philosophy of logic. So while the philosophy of logic does address
some questions about arguments, it does not cover all of them. Thus there might seem to
be space for the philosophy of argument alongside the philosophy of logic.
(b) The second line of criticism is that the philosophy of argument already exists,
just under another name: “informal logic.” One might take comfort in this connection
from the title of Govier’s collection of essays, Philosophy of Argument (1999), which are
mostly on topics in informal logic. The difficulty with this contention is that it is far from
clear precisely what informal logic is. If we take informal logic to consist of what people
who call themselves informal logicians do, then the result is a mix of kinds of activity.
For instance, in analyzing argument schemes, or in proposing ways to diagram
arguments, or in analyzing informal fallacies, it looks like these theorists are engaged in
logic, not the philosophy of argument. If their analyses take them in pragmatic directions,
they are doing normative pragmatics. When they engage in disputes with the PragmaDialectical school about whether there are logical as well as dialectical fallacies, or when
they argue that there are no fallacies, they seem to be engaged in the philosophy of logic,
not the philosophy of argumentation, for their topic is the nature of certain kinds of
logical mistake or miscue. So it seems far from clear that whatever counts as informal
logic it is the philosophy of argument.
(c) The third line of criticism is that the very idea of the philosophy of argument is
a mistake. How can that be, given the five criteria that seem to support this idea? The
criticism I am imagining takes issue with the kind of practice that argumentation is.
Recall that the alleged analogues of argument were practices such as law, education, art
and sport. But is argumentation in fact a practice like these? In an insightful article about
the kind of practice that Ralph Johnson’s conception of argument sets out in Manifest
Rationality (2000), Kvernbekk (2008) makes a case that implies that argumentation is not
a practice like art, education or sport.
Kvernbekk’s topic is whether the sense in which Johnson thinks argumentation is
a practice is, as Johnson contends, similar to MacIntyre’s famous analysis of the concept
of a practice in After Virtue (1984). Essential to MacIntyre’s concept is the property that a
10
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practice has an internal telos: it is engaged in entirely for its own sake (Kvernbekk, p.
271). Kvernbekk borrows Miller’s (1994) distinction between self-contained practices
and purposive practices:
Self contained practices are those where the whole point of the activity consists in internal goods
and their achievements, and purposive practices exist to serve some end beyond themselves
(Kvernbekk p. 274).

MacIntyrean practices are self-contained, whereas, Kvernbekk notes, argumentation on
Johnson’s conception is purposive. If Kvernbekk is right, and if Johnson is right about
argumentation, then argumentation is not the same kind of practice as education, art or
sport. These practices, while they may have some external purposes, are in an essential
way engaged in for their own sake. Argumentation, even though it has an internal telos—
namely, rationality—is essentially engaged in to serve other ends: to persuade or
convince, to inquire, to justify, to come to a decision, to (try to) establish truth, or some
such objective. So at the very least the analogies claimed in the previous section of this
paper between these practices and argumentation are suspect, and as a result, so is the use
of these analogies to argue that if the former were subjects of their own areas of
philosophy, then argumentation should be too.
It might be thought that the analogy with law holds out hope for the philosophy of
argument. For, like argumentation, law is a purposive practice, not a self-contained
practice. Law is not practiced for its own sake, but for the good order of society, and, if
possible also, for justice. Yet the philosophy of law is a well-established field of
philosophy. However, law is a different kind of activity from argument or argumentation.
Law is a set of complex institutionalized purposive practices in a way that argumentation
is not. As a set of mechanisms designed to support the ordering of society and the access
to justice, law raises moral and political philosophical issues that do not apply to
argumentation. Argumentation is used in the service of the practice of law. It is a tool
rather than a mechanism (or set of mechanisms). So, although argumentation and law are
both purposive practices, they are quite different in ways that bear on the question
whether there can be a philosophy of argument or argumentation.
The three objections just considered seem to make a strong case against the idea
of a special branch or field of philosophy deserving the title “philosophy of argument.”
While the first objection overstates the claim that the philosophy of logic covers the
ground claimed for the philosophy of argument, it does correctly note that many of the
issues about argument and argumentation that have received and indeed deserve attention
belong to the philosophy of logic, especially if logic is not restricted to deductive logic.
While the second objection to some extent dissolves under scrutiny—there being no
agreed-upon problematic that might be termed “informal logic’’—that fact is cold
comfort, since what is carried on under the rubric “informal logic” seems to be
straightforwardly logic, albeit informal, or philosophy of logic, or normative pragmatics.
The third objection provides an explanation as to why the philosophy of argument is not
an established field, namely that argument and argumentation do not constitute the kind
of self-contained or institutionalized practice that justifies a field of philosophy devoted
to its analysis.
However, this conclusion does not imply that argument and argumentation do not
deserve philosophical inquiry. A closer analogue of argument and argumentation than
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law, art, education or sport is reason and reasoning. Like argumentation, reasoning has a
vexed relationship with logic; and while it serves ends beyond itself, it too is a tool rather
than a mechanism. And reasoning is instructive in another respect. Reasoning has
received considerable attention from philosophers without there being a field of
philosophy called the philosophy of reasoning.
While the analogies appealed to above in arguing for the philosophy of argument
as a special field turn out to be suspect, the philosophical issues listed are not thereby
dissolved. The nature of argument and argumentation are philosophical vexing issues.
What norms ought to apply to argument and argumentation are at the present, pace
Pragma-Dialectics, very much matters worthy of philosophical investigation. The
concepts employed in the analysis and evaluation of arguments and argumentation
require close philosophical analysis, as do the relations between argument and
argumentation, on the one hand, and logic and reasoning, dialectics and rhetoric, to name
some of the prominent neighbouring concepts, on the other. As to whether there can be a
philosophy of argument (as distinct from a field of philosophy called the philosophy of
argument), that is a question I will leave unaddressed.
4. CONCLUSION
This inquiry began by arguing for the premises that argument and argumentation deserve
prominent philosophical attention yet they do not receive it, and offering a couple of
possible explanations. Those premises led to the question whether these topics might
receive more attention from philosophers if they were understood to belong to a
recognizable field of philosophy, namely the philosophy of argument. That question in
turn motivated an inquiry into whether such a field exists, or should be considered to
exist, as a stand-alone field of philosophy, on a par with such fields as the philosophy of
art, of education, or law, or of sport. Five properties of such accepted fields of philosophy
were examined, and those properties appeared to belong also to argument. The analogies
suggested that argument might also be a legitimate field of philosophy in its own right.
However, upon critical examination, it emerged that many of the questions that are raised
about arguments and argumentation belong either to the philosophy of logic, or to logic
itself, or to normative pragmatics. Moreover, what made argument initially plausible as
an independent field of philosophy like the philosophy of art, education, law or sport,
namely that fact that it is a significant practice, turns out to be misleading. For argument
is not, like art, education and sport, a self-contained practice with ends internal to itself,
but a purposive practice with external ends. Moreover, unlike law, which is also a
purposive practice, argument is not a set of institutional mechanisms, but simply a tool,
like reasoning.
Although the prospects of an independent field of philosophy called the
philosophy of argument are thus not advanced by the arguments considered here, it would
be a mistake to conclude that argument does not deserve serious attention by the
discipline of philosophy. The arguments for that position remain untouched by
conclusion that the idea of a philosophy of argument does not seem to be supported. So
those philosophers who think it important to gain more attention to the study of
arguments and argumentation by the discipline of philosophy will have to find other
approaches to make their case.
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